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Statement of Issues and Standards of Review
Amber McKelvey claims that her brothers, Stuart Hamilton and Vincent Hamilton
(the "Hamilton brothers"), received more of their father's estate than they should have
under certain findings of fact and conclusions of law entered in 1994 in a separate
probate action (1994 FFCL). Specifically, Ms. McKelvey complains that the Hamilton
brothers received $699,460 worth of shares in their father's company, Hamilton Bros.
Electric, Inc. (the Company), but should have received only $199,680 worth of shares, an
alleged windfall of $499,780. (AOB at 1.) In explaining this alleged "windfall,"
however, Ms. McKelvey simply ignores those aspects of the 1994 FFCL that undermine
her windfall assertion. As the district court observed, in light of the entire 1994 FFCL,
the issues look quite different.
The 1994 FFCL explains how all estate property was distributed, and undermines
virtually every claim in the opening brief. In 1994, the value of the estate's assets,
including the Company, was $1,957,242. (R. 1256.) The estate's liabilities were
$1,065,577. (R. 1256.) The net value therefore was $891,665. (R. 1255.) The five heirs
(the Hamilton brothers, Ms. McKelvey, and their two sisters) were to receive 1/5 portions
of the estate (not merely the Company), which came to $178,333 per heir. Ms.
McKelvey received $195,000, of which $141,508 was Company stock. (R. 1254.) This
is more than a 1/5 portion.
The other two sisters also received $195,000 each, but did not receive the entire
amount in 1994. Instead, the two sisters made a cash election and were to receive future
distributions totaling $283,016 (plus 6% interest per year) after the Hamilton brothers had
sold certain real property in the estate valued at $163,500, property earmarked to help pay
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not only the two sisters but other estate liabilities. (R. 1253,1256-57.) Importantly, with
a net value of the estate of $891,665 and the Company valued at $841,000, there was
only $50,000 of non-Company assets to pay the two sisters their $283,016. The
Hamilton brothers were therefore required personally to guarantee future payments to the
two sisters, thereby assuming all risks associated with the real property's future value.
(R. 1252.)
Ms. McKelvey's complaint that the Hamilton brothers received more Company
stock is therefore partially explained by the fact that they were personally responsible for
(i) estate liabilities and (ii) the $283,016 future payments to the two sisters. The 1994
FFCL also allowed the Hamilton Brothers to receive a fee as administrators, which they
also took in Company stock. There was no windfall, only a fortunate upturn in the real
estate market after 1994 that permitted the Hamilton brothers to pay their two sisters with
proceeds from the real estate sales while using very little of their own money or having to
sell their Company stock.
In the end, the only inequity is that the Hamilton brothers must incur additional
expense in defending this appeal. The opening brief not only fails to describe the estate
distributions accurately, but also fails to disclose that Ms. McKelvey is challenging a
ruling that she urged the district court to make. In the district court, Ms. McKelvey
asserted that the 1994 FFCL is unambiguous; but on appeal, she argues that the 1994
FFCL is ambiguous and should be construed against the Hamilton brothers. (R. 1923:47;
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AOB at 30.) Thus, if the district court erred in ruling the 1994 FFCL is unambiguous, the
error was invited, and this court should refuse to consider it.1
With the 1994 FFCL properly construed and the issues on appeal confined only to
those Ms. McKelvey raised in the district court, the issues look quite different.
Issue 1: Whether the district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor
of the Hamilton brothers, where the 1994 FFCL unambiguously specifies that the
Hamilton brothers were to receive whatever portions of the estate remained after
(i) distributions to Ms. McKelvey and the two sisters and (ii) payment of all other estate
obligations, and it is undisputed that the Hamilton brothers received only these portions.
Standard of Review: "A district court's decision to grant summary judgment is
reviewed for correctness." Oman v. Davis Sch. Dist, 2008 UT 70. If 14. 194 P.3d 956.
Issue 2: Whether the district court abused its discretion in enforcing a partial
settlement agreement where the parties (i) agreed to specific terms; (ii) began performing
under those specific terms; and (iii) later failed to agree only upon specific language.
Standard of Review: "[A] trial court's summary enforcement of a settlement
agreement will not be reversed on appeal unless it is shown that there was an abuse of
discretion. . .. [WJhether a contract exists between parties is a question of law which we
review for correctness." John Deere Co. v. A&H Equip., Inc., 876 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah
Ct.App. 1994).

1

Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, 1117, 164 P.3d 366 ("a party cannot take advantage of an
error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error").
9256306
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• Issue 31 Whether the disti ict coin t abused its discretion in (i) excluding evidence
concerning fraud where no fraud claims had been alleged or (ii) denying Ms. W i ^ i v e y
leave to amend her pleadings to add fraud allegations after the close of discovery
Standard of Review

Mi, d:;<iii "' -turfs i1 .T 1 - ;, -, MI • 'v'lh";

''

i !'i '

evidence is reviewed for abuM. ol discretion. Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 2004 UT

to permit a reply to an answer Utah R Civ. P. 7(a); Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co,5
854 P.2d 1025, 10.28 ( Utah Ct. App. 1993).
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Statement of the Case
L

Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings
This case involves a very belated challenge to a 1994 court-ordered distribution of

estate assets. To understand the various issues in the opening brief, it is important to
become familiar with both the original probate action and the current lawsuit. In this
section, the Hamilton brothers first provide a procedural overview of both lawsuits and
then in the statement of facts provide a more detailed explanation of the operative orders.
A.

The 1994 Probate Action

The parties to this action are siblings and the sole shareholders of Hamilton Bros.
Electric, Inc. (the Company). (R. 1908.) Ms. McKelvey and the Hamilton brothers
obtained their shares of the Company from the estate of their father, Gordon Dean
Hamilton. (R. 1908.) In settling their father's estate in 1994, the district court judge,
Judge Burningham, entered the 1994 FFCL and an order granting an interim distribution
of assets to Ms. McKelvey, the Hamilton brothers, and their two sisters. (R. 1248-76.)
The 1994 FFCL and order are attached to this brief at Addenda A and B. At times, the
Hamilton brothers will refer collectively to the 1994 FFCL and the subsequent order as
the "1994 FFCL."
The 1994 FFCL describes the distribution of estate assets. (R. 1248-69.) The
distribution of Company stock that forms the basis of Ms. McKelvey's claims on appeal
stems from the 1994 FFCL. In 1994, Ms. McKelvey neither objected to nor appealed the
1994 FFCL or order stemming from it.
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B.

The Pleadings in this Lawsuit

against the Hamilton .brothers. The original complaint concerned themahagement oi
< 'onipimv 'ill*1! Il'11"" I'^'l di"«Jnhii(iui iml .illegal llit' lolluWhiji, causes \A iii.lh
(i) breach of contract; (ii) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing;
(

. xLion of records, i < • ..J accounting; (v) conversion; (vi) breach of fiduciary

duty; and (vii) negligence, ^iv. i-L • in response tc a motion to dismiss Ms McKel \ e>
filed an amended complaint that excluded the inspection of records and full accounting
claims I
The Hamilton brothers filed counterclaims tor (i i breach ol contract; (ii) breach of
tilli! i. iiu 11»:

. -.-,a..:i:,

•. co:x»u.

.

..u

* .hment; and

(v) breach of iiuuciary duty. (IL 13w!/.) These counterclaims are important because
tlleir dismissal was later consideration for the partial settlement agreement Ms, McKelvey
disputes.
On March 17, 2006, Ms, McKelvey filed a second amended complaint. (R, 561-

1/3 owner of the Company as oi J 9 l u, despite the fact that Ms. McKelvey received, only
1 hK\ of llii; loll Il II! Ii 01

C.

•

i Our IctiiiM I O l l u : | 4 * M H " ! 'I . l i d . )

The Court Enters Partial Summary Judgment on Ms. Mt K i *
Challenge to the Original Distribution of Company Shares

*

judgment asking the district court to determine as a matter of law that Ms. McKelvey and
the Hamilton brothers received appropriate distribution0 °f Company shares under the
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1994 FFCL. (R. 612-14.) Both Ms. McKelvey and the Hamilton brothers agreed that the
relevant language in the 1994 FFCL was unambiguous. (R. 692; 1107; 1110; 1114;
1287; 1923:37, 40, 58-59.) Ms. McKelvey asserted that under the plain language of the
1994 FFCL the Hamilton brothers should have received the same number of shares as
Ms. McKelvey (1,683 shares). The Hamilton brothers argued that they appropriately
received more shares under the language in the 1994 FFCL that provided to them "all
remaining assets of the estate," including any remaining shares of stock. (Id.)
The district court granted partial summary judgment after it concluded that the
1994 FFCL expressly authorized the distribution of 1,683 shares to McKelvey, and
effectively authorized 4,158.5 shares to Vincent Hamilton, and 4,158.5 shares to Stuart
Hamilton. (R. 1391; 1378-86.) The first issue in the opening brief challenges this ruling.
D.

The Court Enforces a Partial Settlement Agreement Between
Ms. McKelvey and the Hamilton Brothers

On July 17, 2007, the Hamilton brothers moved to enforce a partial settlement
agreement between the Hamilton brothers and Ms. McKelvey. (R. 1556.) Prior to the
district court's interpretation of the 1994 FFCL, the parties had agreed that they would
(i) jointly hire and pay for a business valuation expert and (ii) limit the litigation to one
issue—Ms. McKelvey's percentage ownership in the Company. (R. 1481; 1727; 1556.)
After Ms. McKelvey's attorney who had negotiated the partial settlement agreement had
withdrawn and Ms. McKelvey had hired new counsel, Ms. McKelvey denied that the
parties had ever reached such an agreement. (R. 1581.)
The district court enforced the settlement agreement based on the correspondence
between the parties and the parties' subsequent actions. (R. 1735; 1912.) The court
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o r d ^ ou that,'as a result of the partial settlement, the onlj i emaining issue cone e i lie d
ivis. ivlcKelvey's percentage interest in the Company. (R. 1911; 1 724 35.) A n d because
M s . M c K e l v e y ' s interest previously had been determined by the order granting partial
'luminary pjcliniiPtil nn r I a 11 f i s rntmifinl

I V I VM I I lir s n mid issue raised in the

opening brief challenges these rulings.
E.

I

Prior to the court's order enforcing the settlement agreement, on October 19, 2007,
Ms. McKelvey had filed a "notion i.i . J: i-ine seeking to introduce evidence tna. .

/ears

car IHT tin1 1 Inimllori hi t*u * had eima»ed in fraud and sell-dealing to procure the 1994
FFCL.

Ms. M c K e h e y also sought leave to amend her pleadings to include

, I.M n . : u d aij-

» : ; • • .

•

j

*

-

'«•!'

?

court denied the motions o*, numerous grounds, including (i) the issues that
Ms. McKelvey was attempting io raise Ii<ne aliuid) Im-ett icsuli, \ ml

Ilii, lilii .ilium

iI

(ii) an amended pleading "'would be untimely and i mduly prejudicial. 5 ' (R. 1905,) 1 1 le
third and fourth issues in the opening b n a challenge this ruling.
II.

lit of Facts
A.

The Ownership I n t e r e s t s of the Hamilton Brothers and Ms. M c K e l v e y

Die fii st issi le raised in tl le opening brief cc ncei i is tl »< * 1994 distribution

uhe

estate. In his will, the parties' father stated that his estate shall he distributed equalh
among [he live childiui, Nliiiiil Hamilton ..iinIII " ,'un nil Hamilton llln I liiiinlloii In mil) iisl,
A m b e r McKelvey (Ms. McKelvey), as well as Lisa Kunz and i'onuii Hamilton (the tv\ o
sisters). (R. 1268.) The will appoints the Hamilton brothers as personal representatives
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of the estate. (R. 1386.) In 1994, Judge Bumingham approved a distribution of the estate
consistent with the will, which is reflected in the 1994 FFCL. (R. 1385; 1276; 1269.)
1.

The 1994 Distribution of Estate Assets

In the 1994 FFCL, Judge Bumingham concluded that the net value of the estate
was $891,6652 and that the 10,000 shares of Company stock were collectively worth
$841,000 or $84.10 per share. (R. 1255; 1257; 1254.) As contemplated in the will, Judge
Bumingham recognized "that there may be some difficulties with making the shares
equal" because "the corporation would not involve all heirs and the house would
probably not involve all heirs." (R. 1267-68.) Judge Bumingham recognized that
"Amber McKelvey, Lisa H. Kunz and Tonua Hamilton have had very limited
involvement with the actual running of the [Company], while Stuart G. Hamilton and
Vincent C. Hamilton have been actively involved for a period of at least twenty or more
years and have been a significant factor in preserving the [Company] as an asset for all
heirs." (R. 1262.) In addition, to preserve the Company, the Hamilton brothers had been
required to pledge all of their personal assets as "security to maintain the bonding" to
prevent the Company from having "to turn over the projects and jobs to other contractors
of the bonding company's choosing." (R. 1258.)
Judge Bumingham then concluded that Ms. McKelvey and the two sisters would
receive a distribution equal to $195,000.3 (R. 1254-55.) This $195,000 figure included a
2

Judge Bumingham determined that the gross value of the estate was $1,957,242 and the
estate held $1,065,577 in expenses and reserves. (R. 1255.)
3
This is the amount that initially was proposed by the Hamilton brothers as personal
representatives and adopted by the court despite the fact that "$178,333 [should have
been the] actual amount determined by the values found by the Court." (R. 1255.) Thus,
Ms. McKelvey and the two sisters each received more than 1/5 of the net estate.
9256306
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previous distribution made to each heir in the amount of $53,492. (Id.) Therefore,
Ms. McKelvey and each of the two sisters were to receive a prospective distribution
equal to $141,508. (R. Id.) Because not all heirs would be involved in the Company, the
Hamilton brothers offered a variety of distribution options to Ms. McKelvey and the two
sisters. (R. 1255.) While the two sisters chose to receive their distributions in cash
through installment payments, Ms. McKelvey chose to receive her distribution through
Company stock. (R. 1252-54.)
Each of these three distributions is set forth in the 1994 FFCL. The 1994 FFCL
expressly distributes to Ms. McKelvey 1,683 shares of Company stock, which at the
$84.10 share price made this distribution slightly more than the $141,508 owed to
Ms. McKelvey. (R. 1254; 1276-77.) Ms. McKelvey concedes in the opening brief that
she received this distribution specified in the 1994 FFCL. (AOB at 6; R. 1923:30.)
The two sisters chose to receive their $141,508 in deferred cash payments instead
of stock. (R. 1275.) Their cash distributions included a $37,500 payment to each sister,
and the remaining $104,008 owed to each sister to be paid in installments of no less than
$20,000 per year. (R. 1275; 1252-53.) The unpaid portion of the distribution accrued
interest at a rate of 6% per year. (R. 1275; 1252-53.) The Hamilton brothers signed a
personal guaranty for the total $208,016 obligation to the two sisters and were directed to
raise part of the money by later selling certain real property in the estate valued by the
court at $163,500. (R. 1275; 1255-57; 1253.) If no real estate were sold during a
calendar year, then "$20,000 each is to be paid by the Personal Representative to each."
(R. 1275.) On at least one occasion, the Hamilton brothers made $20,000 payments out
of their own pockets. (R. 662.)
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To secure the payment system, Ms. McKelvey and the two sisters deeded their
interests in the estate's real property to the Hamilton brothers and then the two sisters
recorded a lien against this property. (R. 1252.) Accordingly, the distributions to the two
sisters became personal obligations of the Hamilton brothers in the event the estate was
unable to make payments.
The 1994 FFCL also required that "there is to be reserved the sum of $128,500 for
attorney fees, appraisals and taxes to conclude the litigation and tax audits." (R. 1274.)
If this money became insufficient for administration of the estate, the Hamilton brothers
were personally responsible for paying any further expenses. (R. 1273.) Conversely, the
1994 FFCL stated that any money left over from the $128,500 reserve was to be shared
by all five heirs. (R. 1273; 125 L) In other words, the Hamilton brothers alone bore the
risk of any shortfall, but all heirs would share in any net benefit to the estate.4
Finally, the 1994 FFCL stated that all properties not otherwise reserved or
distributed to Ms. McKelvey and her sisters shall be distributed to the Hamilton brothers:
"all other assets of the Estate, except the reserves of $128,500 and the Mary Hamilton
Property, is to be distributed to Stuart G. Hamilton and Vincent C. Hamilton, in kind,
subject to the terms of the cash and deferred cash payment (sic) Lisa H. Kunz and Tonua
Hamilton and the stock distributed to Amber McKelvey." (R. 1250-51 (emphasis
added).) The subsequent order reiterates this ruling: "Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed
that all remaining properties of the Estate, other than the reserves of $128,500 and the

The Hamilton brothers were entitled to keep, however, a court-authorized personal
representative fee of $134,540. (R. 1273-74.)
9256306
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properties heretofore awarded to Mary Hamilton, be distributed to Stuart G. Hamilton
and Vincent C. Hamilton equally." (R. 1273 (emphasis added).)
Thus, the district court effectively ordered that all stock not distributed to
Ms. McKelvey was to be distributed to the Hamilton brothers, which is precisely what
occurred. The "in kind" distribution expressly awarded the Hamilton brothers all
remaining property and saddled the Hamilton brothers with all remaining risk and
liabilities. The district court in this case found that Ms. McKelvey's attorney of record
approved the order as to form on January 20, 1994, a finding Ms. McKelvey does not
challenge on appeal.6 (R. 1272, 1380-81.)
2.

The Logic of the 1994 Distribution of Assets

While the 1994 FFCL provided the Hamilton brothers all remaining assets in the
estate, it also saddled the Hamilton brothers with liabilities and obligations that made the
net distribution to the Hamilton brothers less than the distributions to Ms. McKelvey and
the two sisters.
The burdens on the Hamilton brothers were numerous. First, the Hamilton
brothers assumed all of the risks associated with maintaining the Company after their
father's death and after the 1994 FFCL. Second, the Hamilton brothers pledged their
5

Mary Hamilton was Gordon Hamilton's wife, who received, among other things, a life
estate on real property held by the estate. (R. 887-88.)
6
An objection to the proposed Order and 1994 FFCL was filed on January 14, 1994, by
Ms. McKelvey's sister Lisa Kunz. One of the bases for this objection was that under the
proposed Order and 1994 FFCL, Ms. McKelvey was not to receive "one third (1/3) of all
issued and outstanding stock of the corporation." (R. 1175.) It further states that the
Order and 1994 FFCL "do not reflect" that Ms. McKelvey is entitled to one third of the
corporate stock. (R. 1175.) A copy of the Objection was mailed to Ms. McKelvey on
January 14, 1994. (R. 1174.) After considering these objections, Judge Burningham
entered the Order and the 1994 FFCL on January 21, 1994. (R. 1276; 1269.) No party
ever appealed from this order.
9256306
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personal assets for the indemnification of the bonding company after their father's death
to allow the Company to continue operating. (R. 1261-62; 1258.) Third, the Hamilton
brothers signed personal guaranties for the cash distributions to the two sisters.
(R. 1273.) Fourth, the Hamilton brothers assumed all risks associated with the future sale
of the real property in the estate. Fifth, the Hamilton brothers assumed all risks
associated with any shortfall of expenses, taxes, or attorney fees. (R. 1254; 1252; 1273.)
Sixth, the Hamilton brothers indemnified Ms. McKelvey and the two sisters from any and
all claims made against the estate. (R. 1251; 1274.) In other words, while the Hamilton
brothers were entitled to the "remaining" assets of the estate, they solely assumed all
burdens and liabilities associated with the estate—burdens and liabilities not shared by
Ms. McKelvey or her sisters. (R. 1272-75.)
Consistent with the 1994 FFCL, Gordon Hamilton's shares in the Company were
canceled, and 1683 shares were issued to Ms. McKelvey. (R. 648.) Also, because the
estate had no cash to pay the Hamilton brothers their fee as personal representatives, the
Hamilton brothers instead received 1600 shares of Company stock to satisfy their
$134,540 fee. (R. 1273-74.) Then, pursuant to the 1994 FFCL, the remaining shares
were divided equally between the Hamilton brothers. (R. 1273.) The end result was that
each Hamilton brother received 4,158.5 shares. And again the value, if any, of that stock
was wholly dependent on the Hamilton brothers' continuing to operate the business.
Importantly, when the distributions were made, there were many unknowns,
including (i) the amount the Hamilton brothers would have to contribute personally
toward liabilities and to pay their two sisters, (ii) the viability of the Company, and
(iii) the liabilities they would incur personally to indemnify Ms. McKelvey and the two
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sisters. (R. 1272-76.) These risks were the Hamilton brothers'alone. Even so,
Ms. McKelvey and the two sisters received a greater share of the estate in 1994. As
stated above, the net worth of the estate was $891,665, and Ms. McKelvey and the two
sisters each received $195,000, a total of $585,000. This means that the Hamilton
brothers each received $153,332, which was nearly $40,000 less than Ms. McKelvey.
The fact that the Hamilton brothers were able to discharge the liabilities and pay the two
sisters, while keeping their shares in the Company, does not retroactively change the fact
that the court-ordered distribution was equitable at the time it was made.
C.

The Parties Enter Into a Settlement Agreement Disposing of All Claims
Other than Ms. McKelvey's Declaratory Judgment Claim

In February 2006, after Ms. McKelvey had lost her bid to appoint a receiver for
the Company, Ms. McKelvey's then counsel, Benson L. Hathaway, called the Hamilton
brothers' counsel and proposed a partial settlement agreement. (R. 1734; 504; 1456.)
Under the settlement agreement proposed by Mr. Hathaway, the parties "jointly agree on
a business valuation expert who could render an opinion on the value of the Company,
the cost of which would be shared by our clients [and] to limit the issues now before the
court solely to the issue of what Ms. McKelvey's percentage ownership is." (R. 1734;
1456.) The Hamilton brothers' counsel memorialized these terms in a letter dated
February 24, 2006, and stated that "my clients agree to this proposal."7 (R. 1734; 1456.)
Mr. Hathaway does not dispute these facts. (R. 1559-62.)

n

On March 21, 2006, the Hamilton brothers' counsel sent another letter to Mr. Hathaway
mentioning, for the first time, that the appraisal would be binding on the parties.
(R. 1733.) Importantly, this was after the parties had agreed on the other two issues.
(R. 1725.)
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The subsequent actions of Ms. McKelvey and her counsel confirm that this
agreement was reached. Within one week of the Hamilton brothers' acceptance,
Mr. Hathaway proposed the names of two business valuation experts who could appraise
the value of the Company, experts the parties then interviewed. (R. 1732.)
Ms. McKelvey amended her complaint to include a claim for declaratory relief relating to
her percentage ownership in the Company. (R. 1731.) Ms. McKelvey also agreed that
the Hamilton brothers did not need to answer this second amended complaint because the
o

settlement agreement would dispose of many of her claims. (R. 1447; 1727.)
Even though an oral agreement (memorialized in writing) was reached, a written
settlement agreement was never signed. (R. 1445.) Subsequently, Ms. McKelvey
retained new counsel and the district court granted summary judgment declaring that
Ms. McKelvey was entitled to no more than 1683 shares of Company stock. (R. 1391;
1432.) Based on the settlement agreement, this should have ended the litigation. It did
not. (R. 1555.) After Ms. McKelvey's new counsel would not agree to dismiss the
remaining claims, the Hamilton brothers were forced to move the district court to enforce
the partial settlement agreement. (R. 1481.) After full briefing and argument, the district
court found an enforceable settlement agreement wherein the parties agreed (i) to
commission a business valuation expert and (ii) to limit the operative claims in this
lawsuit to Ms. McKelvey's claim for a declaration that her percentage ownership in the
Company is greater than that reflected in the 1994 FFCL. (R. 1727.)
o

Eventually, after many months and after new counsel became involved, the Hamilton
brothers took the cautionary step of answering the second amended complaint, asserting
that the claims were barred by an accord and satisfaction reached with Ms. McKelvey's
prior counsel. (R. 1421; 1414.) Based on the partial settlement agreement, this answer
included no counterclaims. (Id.)
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D.

Ms. McKelvey Seeks to Revive Her Case

After having settled all claims except her declaratory judgment claim, and after the
district court had declared the percentage ownership of the Company was not the 1/3
percentage Ms. McKelvey wanted, Ms. McKelvey sought to introduce new claims for
fraud and self-dealing. (R. 1713.) The timeline of these claims is important to
understanding why the district court denied Ms. McKelvey's belated request. (R. 1909.)
Ms. McKelvey's original complaint filed on September 29, 2004, did not include
any claims for fraud, self-dealing, or violation of Company bylaws. (R. 1-15.)
Ms. McKelvey's first amended complaint filed on August 10, 2005, also did not include
claims for fraud, self-dealing, or violation of Company bylaws. (R. 75-88.)
In August 2005, the Hamilton brothers filed their answer to the first amended
complaint and counterclaims, which states that the basis for the distribution of shares
from the Company was the 1994 FFCL, which was attached to the Hamilton brothers'
answer. (R. 131-79; 1908.) Thus, as of August 2005, Ms. McKelvey knew that the
Hamilton brothers were relying upon the 1994 FFCL as justification for the then-current
stock distribution. (R. 1905.) On October 21, 2005, Ms. McKelvey answered the
Hamilton brothers' counterclaims with no suggestion (i) of fraud or (ii) that the Hamilton
brothers had failed to distribute Company stock in accordance with Company bylaws.
(R. 341-46.)
In the Hamilton brothers' November 2005 interrogatory responses, they again
asserted that their equity interest in the Company was based upon the 1994 FFCL. (R.
1778-79; 1765-66; 1907.) Ms. McKelvey then filed her second amended complaint on
March 17, 2006, again with no mention of fraud or self-dealing. (R. 561-75.)
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Based on this course of events, the district court concluded that Ms. McKelvey
was on notice "no later than August 2005 or November 2005" that the Hamilton brothers
would rely upon the 1994 FFCL. (R. 1905.) Yet it was not until December 2006 in
papers opposing the Hamilton brothers5 motion for summary judgment that
Ms. McKelvey first alleged the Hamilton brothers had committed some sort of fraud prior
to the 1994 FFCL and had improperly transferred stock from the estate to themselves.
(R. 1098-1160; 1906.) While the Hamilton brothers agreed that Ms. McKelvey did not
need to file a pleading to raise fraud as a defense to the Hamilton brothers' affirmative
defenses, the Hamilton brothers never agreed that, after the grant of summary judgment,
Ms. McKelvey could affirmatively reassert these new grounds to attack collaterally the
validity of the 1994 FFCL. (R. 1717; 1842; 1846.)
The district court agreed that Ms. McKelvey could not assert these new grounds so
many years after the claimed conduct, and at such a late stage in the present litigation.
(R. 1903-09.) Instead, the district court correctly concluded that allowing Ms. McKelvey
to present evidence of an alleged fraud perpetrated on the previous court that entered the
1994 FFCL "would result in allowing [Ms. McKelvey] to amend her pleadings to bring a
new affirmative cause of action to set aside the Order and [FFCL]." (R. 1906.)
Additionally, at a December 6, 2007 hearing before the district court, Ms. McKelvey
"conceded" that the district court's prior rulings "disposed of her contention that [the
Hamilton brothers'] receipt of [Company] stock was voided by the [Company's] bylaws."
(R. 1906.) Finally, the district court correctly concluded that any additional amendments
would be "untimely and unduly prejudicial." (R. 1905.)
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Summary of the Argument
Ms. McKelvey first asserts that the 1994 FFCL did not authorize the Hamilton
brothers to receive 8,317 shares of Company stock. Yet the plain language of the 1994
FFCL provides that the Hamilton brothers are to receive "all remaining properties in the
Estate" and that they will receive their distribution "in kind." (R. 1273; 1251; 1249.)
The Hamilton brothers did receive all remaining shares of Company stock, which
explains their ownership interest in the Company.
Aside from complying with the plain language of the 1994 FFCL, the distribution
also was equitable. In addition to receiving all remaining Company stock, the Hamilton
brothers also "received" (i) personal liability for all debts of the estate, (ii) personal
liability for indemnifying all other heirs, (iii) personal responsibility for ensuring the
Company could continue to conduct business, and (iv) personal liability for making cash
distributions to the two sisters. The 1994 FFCL recognized the net assets of the estate
total $891,665, of which $585,000 was distributed to heirs other than the Hamilton
brothers, leaving them each with net assets worth $153,333. The distribution of 8,317
shares to the Hamilton brothers was therefore both plainly authorized under the 1994
FFCL and entirely equitable.
Ms. McKelvey next claims that the district court erred in enforcing a partial
settlement agreement. This claim also fails. Ms. McKelvey's counsel offered a proposed
partial settlement to the Hamilton brothers' counsel, which was accepted. The terms of
the agreement were that (i) the parties would jointly share the costs of a business
valuation expert and (ii) the litigation would be limited to one claim: a determination of
Ms. McKelvey's percentage ownership in the Company. The parties then performed
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under the terms of this agreement by both hiring and jointly paying for a valuation expert
and prosecuting and defending only the single claim concerning Ms. McKelvey's
percentage ownership. The Hamilton brothers surrendered all of their counterclaims.
The fact that Ms. McKelvey's subsequent counsel wanted to escape from the agreement
after the district court had ruled that Ms. McKelvey is entitled only to the percentage
ownership she currently possesses does not change that fact that an agreement had been
reached.
Finally, Ms. McKelvey asserts that the district court abused its discretion in
denying her leave to introduce fraud claims after all her other claims had failed.
Ms. McKelvey sought to introduce these new fraud claims as a defense to the
enforceability of the asset distribution described in the 1994 FFCL. Yet Ms. McKelvey
had known for a very long time that the Hamilton brothers would rely upon the terms of
the 1994 FFCL prior to her raising the issue in motion papers. Only after the district
court rejected Ms. McKelvey's interpretation of the 1994 FFCL did she seek to amend
her pleadings to include a claim that the 1994 FFCL—to which Ms. McKelvey neither
objected nor appealed in 1994—was the result of some sort of fraud and self-dealing on
the part of the Hamilton brothers. In any event, the fraud allegations make no sense
because the Hamilton brothers received less of the net estate, not more. The trial court
acted appropriately and within its discretion in denying Ms. McKelvey's leave to amend
her pleadings to add fraud claims.
The court should affirm on all counts.
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Argument
I.

The 1994 FFCL Authorized Ms. McKelvey to Receive 1,683 Company Shares
and the Hamilton Brothers to Receive any Remaining Shares
The first issue concerns the distribution of Company stock to the Hamilton

brothers under the terms of the 1994 FFCL. In the district court, all parties agreed that
this issue could be determined as a matter of law because the language of the 1994 FFCL
was unambiguous. Thus, the district court was asked to determine whether the plain
language of the 1994 FFCL authorized the distribution of 1683 shares of Company stock
to Ms. McKelvey and 4,158.5 shares of Company stock to each of the Hamilton brothers.
The reason the posture of the issue presented to the district court is important is
that Ms. McKelvey has raised in the opening brief a host of new arguments that are not
properly before this court. First, Ms. McKelvey argues on appeal that the 1994 FFCL is
ambiguous, something she expressly denied in the district court. Second, Ms. McKelvey
suggests fraud and self-dealing as a way to attack the 1994 FFCL, even though in the
district court Ms. McKelvey raised fraud and self-dealing only in response to defenses
involving res judicata and a statute of limitations, defenses that the district court rejected
and that have not been appealed.
As demonstrated below, the only issue before the court concerning the 1994 FFCL
is whether the plain language of the 1994 FFCL authorized the distribution of 4,158.5
shares to each Hamilton brother. It is difficult to understand how language that expressly
distributes all residual property in the estate to the Hamilton brothers could have operated
to do anything other than distribute 4,158.5 shares to each of the Hamilton brothers, since
that was the stock left over after all other distributions.
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A.

Before the District Court, All Parties Agreed that the 1994 FFCL and
Subsequent Order Are Unambiguous

The 1994 FFCL is unambiguous, which is precisely what Ms. McKelvey argued
before the district court. Specifically, Ms. McKelvey argued that under the plain
language of the 1994 FFCL, the Hamilton brothers should not have received the
remaining 8,317 shares of Company stock.9 At oral argument, her counsel stated that
"[Ms. McKelvey] is completely satisfied with the findings of fact and conclusions of
law." (R. 1923:37.) He repeatedly stressed that Ms. McKelvey was not challenging the
1994 FFCL and that the district court should interpret the 1994 FFCL as a matter of law.
(R. 1923:37, 40, 58-59.) Most telling, when asked by the district court why
Ms. McKelvey had cited the decision in Culbertson,10 a case that concerns an ambiguous
court order, Ms. McKelvey's counsel responded that it was the Hamilton brothers who
argued ambiguity, not Ms. McKelvey. (R. 1923:47.) The Hamilton brothers, however,
have consistently argued only that the 1994 FFCL and subsequent order unambiguously
authorized distribution of the remaining shares of Company stock to the Hamilton
brothers. (R. 692; 1287.)
Inconsistent with her prior position, on appeal Ms. McKelvey argues that the 1994
FFCL is ambiguous and must be construed against the Hamilton brothers. (AOB at 30,
31-36.) This argument is not preserved.11 Gardner v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2008 UT
6, ^[19 n.4, 178 P.3d 893 (recognizing that an argument "not raised below" is "not
9

McKelvey argued that the Hamilton brothers' distribution both was not authorized by
the 1994 FFCL and was in violation of the 1994 FFCL. (R. 1114; 1107; 1110.) She did
not argue that the 1994 FFCL was ambiguous.
10
Culbertson v. Board of County Commissioners, 2001 UT 108, 44 P.3d 642.
11
Ms. McKelvey has consistently claimed throughout this litigation that she was entitled
to 1/3 of the Company under the plain language of the 1994 FFCL. (R. 1922:70-71.)
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preserved and cannot properly come before us on appeal"). Worse, to the extent
Ms. McKelvey is correct that the 1994 FFCL is ambiguous—which it is not—the district
court's error was invited by Ms. McKelvey. Under the invited error doctrine, "a party
cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court
into committing the error." Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, f 17, 164 P.3d 366. The
Supreme Court has identified three factors to consider in determining whether an error
was invited: (i) whether the issue was timely raised; (ii) whether the issue was
specifically raised; and (iii) whether the party introduced supporting evidence or relevant
legal authority. Id. at^|15. Here, Ms. McKelvey specifically represented to the district
court that the 1994 FFCL was unambiguous and never argued that the language was
ambiguous. Ms. McKelvey therefore neither expressly raised this issue nor introduced
evidence or case law to support the claim she now raises for the first time on appeal
This court should therefore interpret the 1994 FFCL as the district court did, as a matter
of law. (R. 1391-93; 1378-86.) The plain language of the 1994 FFCL confirms that the
district court was correct.
B.

The Plain Language of the 1994 FFCL and Order Confirms that the
Distribution of Stock to the Hamilton Brothers Was Authorized

Reviewing the "'plain language' of [an order] . . . is invariably the first order of
business in construing legally significant writings." Magnesium Corp. of Am. v. Air
Quality Bd., 941 P.2d 653, 659 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citing to cases interpreting statutes,
administrative rules, deeds, letters of intent, and lease agreements). When interpreting an
order, it should be "construe[d] . . . in its entirety and to reconcile and harmonize all of its
provisions, as is also required." Id The only time a court should look beyond the plain
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language of an order is "when it may reasonably cbe understood to have two or more
plausible meanings.5" Utah Pub. Employees Ass'n. v. Utah, 2006 UT 9,160, 131 P.3d
208. The plain language of the 1994 FFCL, and in particular the language concerning the
number of shares Ms. McKelvey and the Hamilton brothers were to receive, cannot be
understood to have two or more plausible meanings.
At the time the 1994 FFCL was entered, the gross estate was valued at $1,957,242,
and the total expenses and reserves of the estate totaled $1,065,577, leaving a net value of
$891,665. (R. 1255.) As a result, the district court determined that each heir was entitled
to a distribution of $178,333. The district court nonetheless elected to issue to
Ms. McKelvey and the two sisters a distribution equal to $195,000 because this larger
amount had been previously proposed by the Hamilton brothers. (R. 1254-55.)
Also at the time of the 1994 FFCL, the shares of the Company comprised less than
half of the value of the gross estate. There were 10,000 shares valued at $84.10 each,
which totaled $841,000. (R. 1256.) Thus, the 1683 shares distributed to Ms. McKelvey
were worth approximately $141,508, which combined with a previous distribution to
Ms. McKelvey of $53,492, brings the value of the total distribution to Ms. McKelvey to
$195,000. (R. 1254-55.) It is undisputed that this is precisely what Ms. McKelvey
received. In other words, there is no question that Ms. McKelvey received all of the
stock to which she was entitled under the plain language of the 1994 FFCL.
Similarly, the distribution to the two sisters totaled $195,000 each. Because the
two sisters also had previously received $53,500 in estate property, under the terms of the
Further, McKelvey's cites Culbertson v. Board of County Commissioners is irrelevant.
2001 UT 108,1115, 44 P,3d 642. (AOB at 30.) Where all parties agree there are no
ambiguities, the court need not construe ambiguities against either party.
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1994 FFCL they were still owed $141,508 each. (R. 1253.) The two sisters elected to be
paid in cash, but the estate did not have sufficient cash to pay them immediately. So they
agreed to be paid in the future while the unpaid balance accrued interest at a rate of 6%.
(R. 1253.) It is undisputed that the two sisters were eventually paid according to the
terms set forth in the 1994 FFCL.13
The only remaining issue, with regard to the plain language of the 1994 FFCL, is
whether the Hamilton brothers received their distribution in accordance with the 1994
FFCL.14 They did. The 1994 FFCL states that the Hamilton brothers would receive "all
remaining properties of the Estate," or elsewhere, "all other assets of the Estate," or
elsewhere, "[a]ll other property of the Estate." (R. 1273; 1251; 1249.) The Hamilton
brothers did receive all other assets, and liabilities, in the estate. Therefore, in the end,
there also is no dispute concerning whether the Hamilton brothers' distribution was in
accordance with the 1994 FFCL.
C.

The Hamilton Brothers Did Not Receive a Windfall

Perhaps recognizing that the plain language of the 1994 FFCL provides for exactly
the distribution the Hamilton Brothers received, Ms. McKelvey's focus shifts to whether
McKelvey also faults the Hamilton brothers for their belief that the cash distributions
to the two sisters were a "buy-out" of the sisters' shares. (AOB at 7.) This is a red
herring. The heirs' personal views concerning the legal implications of what occurred are
irrelevant. Regardless, Ms. McKelvey herself believed the same thing. (R. 1922:58
("That when my sisters were bought out, it all went one-third/one-third.").)
14
At times, McKelvey argues that the Hamilton brothers are entitled to less than 1,683
shares. (R. 1923: 46, 49.) On this point, the district court questioned how Judge
Burningham could have intended Ms. McKelvey to become the majority shareholder in a
company in which she "never participated, and really its value is tied up in those who
worked for it." (R. 1923:49.) Based on the plain language of the will and the 1994
FFCL, the Hamilton brothers, as the only heirs involved with the Company, were plainly
intended to be in charge of the Company after their father's death. (R. 1258; 1260; 1262;
1263; 1267.)
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the Hamilton brothers received a windfall by receiving the remaining assets of the estate
in accordance with the 1994 FFCL. (AOB at 1.) Apart from having nothing to do with
the plain language of the 1994 FFCL, this complaint is simply incorrect and gains
traction only by ignoring entirely the liabilities the Hamilton brothers incurred.
The gross assets of the estate totaled $1,957,242. Apart from the $195,000 paid to
Ms. McKelvey and each of the two sisters, the Hamilton brothers together received the
balance of the estate, which had a gross value of $1,372,242. This was a windfall, argues
Ms. McKelvey, since the Hamilton brothers were each entitled to the same 1/5
distribution of the estate. Of course, what this ignores is the known liabilities of the
estate, which totaled $1,065, 577.15 Therefore, the net distribution to the Hamilton
brothers was $306,665 for both of them; hardly a windfall, and, in fact, less than the
distribution to the other heirs.16
In addition, the Hamilton brothers assumed great risk that no other heir assumed.
First, the court set aside a $128,500 reserve for attorney fees, appraisals, and taxes to
satisfy liabilities associated with pending litigation and tax audits. The 1994 FFCL
expressly provided that if this reserve amount is inadequate, then the Hamilton brothers

The liabilities included (i) $12,779 in funeral expenses; (ii) $94,805 in debt expenses;
(iii) $17,329 in mortgage expenses; (iv) $290,804 to Mary Hamilton (the wife);
(v) $216,358 in administrative and attorney fees; (vi) $301,600 in taxes; (vii) $3,202 for
miscellaneous expenses; and (viii) $128,500 in reserves for a tax audit, attorney fees to
defend a lawsuit, and appraisal fees. (R. 1256.) These liabilities total $1,065,577.
16
McKelvey also claims that the Hamilton brothers received a parcel of real property that
remained in the estate. This is immaterial. The Hamilton brothers have fully paid the
two sisters their cash distributions from the estate, and if any real property remained in
the estate after these obligations were satisfied, such property was to pass to the Hamilton
brothers as additional "remaining property] of the Estate." (R. 1273.)
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alone must make up the difference.

(R. 1251-52; 1254.) Second, the Hamilton brothers

had to indemnify and hold harmless the other three heirs for any adjustments to asset
values as a result of then-pending litigation with the estate. (R. 1251.) Third, the
Hamilton brothers were required to pledge all of their personal assets as security to
continue the business of the Company so that the bonding company would not transfer
their work to competitors. (R. 1261-62; 1258.)
In the end, the Hamilton brothers' receipt of more stock than Ms. McKelvey was
authorized, equitable, and reflected the distribution contemplated in Judge Burningham's
orders. Further, this distribution is consistent with their father's intent that his sons, who
were actively involved in the Company for twenty years, would continue to participate in
the Company while the sisters could choose cash instead. The Company likely would
have floundered without the Hamilton brothers' involvement, which was indispensible to
maximizing the value of Company shares, including Ms. McKelvey's shares.
The district court did not err in concluding that the Hamilton brothers received
what they were entitled to receive under the 1994 FFCL. This court should affirm.
II.

The Parties Entered into a Partial Settlement Agreement Which Disposed of
All Claims and Counterclaims with the Exception of the Declaration of Ms.
McKelvey's Percentage Ownership in the Company
The district court also did not abuse its discretion in enforcing the settlement

agreement. "Settlement agreements may be summarily enforced without an evidentiary
hearing." Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Sys„ Inc., 866 P.2d 58L 584 n.2 (Utah Ct.

The pro rata distribution of any remaining reserves could have been similarly applied
by Judge Burningham to other remaining assets. The fact that the court did not do so
compels the conclusion that it did not intend the remaining stock to be divided among the
siblings, but instead, that the Hamilton brothers alone were entitled to it.
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App. 1993). "In determining whether the parties created an enforceable contact, a court
should consider all preliminary negotiations, offers, and counteroffers and interpret the
various expressions of the parties for the purpose of deciding whether the parties reached
agreement on complete and definite terms." Nunlev v. Westates Casing Servs., Inc.,
1999 UT 100, Tf22, 989 P.2d 1077. Under this law and the facts of this case, this court
should affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in enforcing the settlement agreement
based on the correspondence and conduct of the parties. Contrary to Ms. McKelvey's
iR

assertions, there was ample evidence that the parties had agreed to the material terms of
the enforceable partial settlement agreement. The lack of a written agreement is of no
consequence. And contrary to Ms. McKelvey's suggestion in the opening brief, all
evidence supporting the existence of an agreement was admissible.
A.

The District Court Correctly Concluded that an Enforceable
Agreement Was Reached

Ms. McKelvey's attorney, Mr. Hathaway, made the following offer to the
Hamilton brothers: (i) the parties hire and share the expense of a business valuation
expert and (ii) the parties limit the issues before the district court to Ms. McKelvey's
percentage of ownership in the Company. (R. 1734.) The Hamilton brothers accepted
this offer. And Mr. Hathaway does not dispute these facts.19 (R. 1559-62.) Moreover,
iR

Ms. McKelvey asserts that the Hamilton brothers submitted no evidence of her
agreement to the district court, but the evidence in the record demonstrates that
Mr. Hathaway, her attorney and agent, did agree and that the parties acted in ways
demonstrating that they had reached an agreement. (AOB at 36.)
19
As recognized by the district court, in Mr. Hathaway's affidavit, he conceded that the
parties agreed to "a general concept of terms for an approach toward resolving the
pending litigation" even though the draft settlement agreement was "unacceptable" to
Mr. Hathaway in its "current form" as drafted by the Hamilton brothers' counsel.
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even assuming Mr. Hathaway did not make this offer, when he received correspondence
from the Hamilton brothers accepting his offer, one would have expected Mr. Hathaway
to respond by denying that there was an offer to accept. Tellingly, there was no such
response.
The district court, after thoughtfully analyzing the appropriate case law and tfte
correspondence between the parties, concluded that the terms of this agreement were
unambiguous and that there was a meeting of the minds as to these unambiguous,
definite, material terms. (R. 1725-30.) Brown's Shoe Fit Co. v. Olch, 955 P.2d 357, 364
(Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("The crucial question is whether the parties agreed on the essential
terms of the contract.'5).
"[T]he conduct of the parties indicates that both parties believed a settlement
agreement had been reached." Goodmansen, 866 P.2d at 585. After the agreement was
reached, Mr. Hathaway proposed two possible business valuation experts. Mr. Hathaway
and the Hamilton brothers' counsel set up appointments to interview and choose the
expert. The meetings were canceled and Mr. Hathaway withdrew as counsel for
Ms. McKelvey. Her new counsel and the Hamilton brothers' counsel subsequently
(R. 1726-27.) Accordingly, the district court concluded that there was "no conflicting
evidence as to the existence of a partial settlement agreement." (R. 1727.)
McKelvey asserts that she would not have entered into the agreement without the
buyout provision. Her own actions belie this assertion. Even as Ms. McKelvey denied
the existence of the partial settlement agreement, the parties did share the costs of the
business valuation expert without any agreement that a buyout would follow. And of
course, she made no complaint when the Hamilton brothers dropped their counterclaims
against her. Regardless, the district court correctly concluded that the agreement
evidenced by the February 24 correspondence was silent as to any buyout. (R. 1726;
1537.) The issue was later raised by the Hamilton brothers' attorney (not Ms.
McKelvey's), but not included in later drafts memorializing the settlement agreement.
(R. 1725.) Therefore, a buyout was not essential to the parties' agreement.
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retained a business valuation expert who conducted the evaluation. (R. 1553.)
Ms. McKelvey also filed her second amended complaint to include her declaratory
91

judgment claim—the issue about which the parties agreed to limit the lawsuit.

Finally,

after the parties had entered into the agreement, the Hamilton brothers dismissed their
counterclaims and paid their part for a business valuation. (R. 1725.)
With the evidence of Ms. McKelvey's offer, the Hamilton brothers' acceptance,
and the parties' subsequent actions in accordance with the agreement, the Hamilton
brothers satisfied their burden of demonstrating that an agreement had been reached. The
fact that there were some outstanding issues is irrelevant to the parties' agreement (i) to
retain a business valuation expert and (ii) to limit all of the parties' claims to
Ms. McKelvey's percentage ownership. The district court's ruling should be affirmed.
B.
The Absence of a Writing Does Not Negate an Otherwise Enforceable
Agreement
Once the parties reached their partial settlement agreement, Ms. McKelvey was
legally bound by its terms. "It is of no legal consequence that the parties have not signed
a settlement agreement." Goodmansen, 866 P.2d at 584. "Parties have no right to welch
on a settlement deal during the sometimes substantial period between when the deal is
99

struck and when all necessary signatures can be garnered on a stipulation."

Id. at 585.

" Ms. McKelvey points to this as continued litigation supporting her claim that no
agreement existed; in fact, the opposite is true because the amendment conformed the
case to reflect the parties' agreement.
* As the parties' actions confirm, this was not a case where the parties never intended to
enter an agreement until it had been reduced to writing. Goodmansen, 866 P.2d at 585
(recognizing that "if a written agreement is intended to memorialize an oral contract, a
subsequent failure to execute the written document does not nullify the oral contract"); U
800 Contacts, Inc. v. Wetener, 2005 UT App 523, ^16, 127 P.3d 1241 (finding a writing
necessary where the correspondence included the statement "This offer . . . is not to be
considered legally binding until a physically executed contract between the two
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The circumstances in Goodmansen were similar to those here, where "letters
between [counsel] constitute^] a binding settlement agreement between the parties." Id.;
see also John Deere Co. v. A&H Equip., Inc., 876 P.2d 880 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)23
(recognizing a meeting of the minds to enter a settlement agreement even though one
party changed its mind after the agreement was reduced to writing and demanded
additional terms). Additionally, like the actions of Ms. McKelvey, the subsequent
conduct of the parties in Goodmansen corroborated the existence of the agreement.
Goodmansen, 866 P.2d at 585. In accordance with Goodmansen, the district court here
correctly concluded that the lack of a signed writing was of no consequence. "The parties
did not defer their legal obligations until the contemplated writing was prepared and
executed." (R. 1726.)
C.

The Evidence Supporting the Existence of an Agreement Is Admissible

Contrary to Ms. McKelvey's assertions in the opening brief, the evidence relied
upon by the district court was admissible. Similar evidence has been considered in other
cases. John Deere Co., 876 P.2d at 884-85 ("there are three relevant documents in the
record that changed hands between the parties—two letters and the unsigned settlement
agreement"). Further, Ms. McKelvey's claim that the correspondence is hearsay is not
supported by law. "Statements that constitute verbal acts (e.g., words of contract or
slander) are not hearsay because they are not offered for their truth.. .. Similarly, a
statement offered to show its effect on the person who heard the statement is not
companies is completed. Until the time said contract is executed I may, at my sole
discretion, rescind or modify this offer in any way I see fit."); Engineering Assocs. Inc. v.
Irving Place Assocs., 622 P.2d 784 (Utah 1980).
The district court recognized that the factual situation in the instant case is "strikingly
similar" to the circumstances present in Goodmansen and John Deere. (R. 1726.)
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hearsay." Schindler v. Seiler, 474 F.3d 1008, 1010-11 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing the Fed. R.
Evid. 801(c) advisory committee notes, which state that "the Rule 801(c) excludes from
the definition of hearsay verbal acts and verbal parts of an act in which the statement
itself affects the legal rights of the parties or is a circumstance bearing on conduct
affecting their rights") Here, the Hamilton brothers have offered the correspondence to
show the contract into which the parties entered. By definition, it is not hearsay.
This admissible evidence establishes that the parties entered into a partial
settlement agreement with two material terms: (i) joint payment of a business valuation
expert and (ii) limiting claims before the district court to Ms. McKelvey5s percentage
ownership in the Company. The district court appropriately enforced this partial
settlement agreement.
III.

The District Court Acted Within Its Discretion in Denying (i) a Motion in
Limine to Introduce Evidence Unrelated to Active Claims and (ii) a Motion
For Leave to Amend Her Pleadings
There are two motions at issue in this section. With one motion, Ms. McKelvey

sought to introduce evidence that the 1994 FFCL was a result of fraud. With the other
motion, Ms. McKelvey sought leave to amend her pleadings to include these fraud
allegations. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying either motion.
A.

The Court Need Not Review the Denial of the Motion in Limine

With the motion in limine, Ms. McKelvey sought to introduce at trial evidence
that the 1994 FFCL was a result of fraud. (AOB at 41.) Unless this court reverses the
dismissal of one of Ms. McKelvey's affirmative claims, this motion is irrelevant. If there
are no claims to try, there is no need to determine what evidence will be heard at trial.
More important, the fraud claims are implausible on their face because the Hamilton
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bothers received less, not more, of their 1/5 share of the estate. Thus, assuming there was
fraud—which there was not—the fraud could not have harmed anyone other than the
Hamilton brothers themselves. The belated fraud allegations are a red herring.
If the court does decide to review the denial of the motion in limine, the court
should affirm for all the same reasons it should affirm the denial of Ms. McKelvey's
motion to amend her pleadings.
B-

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying the Motion
For Leave to File Amended Pleadings

Once it was apparent that there were no claims for which Ms. McKelvey could
introduce evidence of fraud, Ms. McKelvey sought leave to file an amended pleading to
include such allegations. These new allegations included nearly 20 pages of new issues
far afield from what had previously been asserted in her first three complaints. (R. 167494.) The district court recognized the new claims aattempt[] to raise . . . affirmative
claims that have already been resolved in this litigation." (R. 1905.) Ms. McKelvey
denies this by claiming that her new fraud allegations are merely responses to the
Hamilton brothers' affirmative defenses. (AOB at 41.) If this is correct, then the court
need not review this issue either. Ms. McKelvey presented her fraud defense in
opposition to the Hamilton brothers' motion for summary judgment on Ms. McKelvey's
request for declaration that she owned 1/3 of the Company. (R. 1098-1115.) The district
court nonetheless granted the motion for summary judgment. Thus, again, these fraud
allegations are not responsive to any operative claims in this lawsuit.24
24

Also, simply because the Hamilton brothers did not object to the argument in an
opposition to motion for summary judgment does not lead to the conclusion that
wholesale introduction of new claims at trial should be permitted. In Lloyd's Unlimited
v. Nature's Way Mktg., Ltd., 753 P.2d 507, 511 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), the court
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Regardless, the district court did not err in denying the motion for leave to file
amended pleadings. A district court must consider three factors "when deciding whether
to grant a motion to amend: (1) the timeliness of the motion; (2) the justification given
by the movant for the delay; and (3) the resulting prejudice to the responding party."
Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co., 854 P.2d 1025,1028 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Here, all
three factors weigh against Ms. McKelvey.
1.

The Motion for Leave to File Amended Pleadings Was Untimely

Eleven years after the fact, in August 2005 the Hamilton brothers confirmed the
obvious, that the 1994 FFCL was the governing document giving rise to their equity
interests in the Company.

(R. 1907-08.) Yet Ms. McKelvey failed to claim fraud or

self-dealing in 1994, and again over the two years following this confirmation. And she
did so only after (i) the close of discovery; (ii) the disposition of dispositive motions, and
(iii) the parties' settlement of all claims except her request for a declaration concerning
her percentage ownership in the Company. In this context, the district court correctly
concluded that the party should have been granted leave to amend its complaint after the
issues were presented at trial. Here, Ms. McKelvey sought permission to introduce the
evidence at trial and the district court exercised its discretion and denied Ms. McKelvey
the opportunity to present evidence of these new claims at trial and also denied her ability
to amend her pleadings by filing a reply.
Ironically, Ms. McKelvey claims that she should have been permitted to amend her
pleadings and introduce evidence of fraud and self-dealing at trial because the Hamilton
brothers had been on notice of these claims for months because she asserted them in the
summary judgment opposition. (AOB at 46.) It is Ms. McKelvey who was on notice that
the Hamilton brothers' claims of stock ownership were a result of the 1994 FFCL for no
less than two years before she sought leave to rebut their claims with the allegations of
fraud and self-dealing. Ms. McKelvey missed her opportunities to assert these claims in
1994, and again between 2005 and 2007.
25
Ms. McKelvey argues that the Hamilton brothers did not rely upon the 1994 FFCL
until November 2006 or February 2007. This allegation was rejected by the district court
and is not supported by the history of the case. (R. 1905.)
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concluded that Ms. McKelvey's request was "untimely and unduly prejudicial." (R.
1905.)
2.

Ms. McKelvey Provided No Justification for Failing to File Her
Motion in a Timely Manner

Ms. McKelvey offers no excuse for the untimely assertion of new claims, and in
fact, before the district court she conceded that the self-dealing claim was disposed of by
prior court rulings. (R. 1906.) The lack of justification is heightened here by the fact that
the pleading Ms. McKelvey sought to file was the unusual vehicle of a reply to
affirmative defenses.26 A "reply to an affirmative defense should not be ordered unless
there is a clear and convincing factual showing of necessity or other extraordinary
circumstances of a compelling nature." Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 24
F.R.D. 325, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).27 Courts hold parties to this high standard because
"[a]verments in a pleading to which no responsive pleading is required or permitted shall
be taken as denied or avoided." FDIC v. First Nat'l. Fin. Co., 587 F.2d 1009, 1012 (9th
Cir. 1978); Beckstrom v. Coastwise Line, 13 F.R.D. 480, 482 (D. Alaska 1953).
Here, Ms. McKelvey did not offer a clear and convincing reason why she should
be allowed any reply, let alone an untimely one. Ms. McKelvey knew the basis for the
Hamilton brothers' equity interest—the 1994 FFCL—for as much as 13, but no less than
two, years before she attempted to assert these new claims to contend that the Hamilton
26

A reply is an inappropriate mechanism to assert new claims that should have been
included in a complaint. Porter v. Theo J. Ely Mfg. Co., 5 F.R.D. 317, 319-20 (W.D. Pa.
1946).

97

"Interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are persuasive where the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure are 'substantially similar' to the federal rules." Tucker v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 54,117 n. 2, 53 P.3d 947 (citing Lund v. Brown, 2000
UT 75,1J26, 11 P.3d 277); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 7 Compiler's Notes (noting that
Utah's rule 7 is similar to federal rule 7).
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brothers' interests are invalid. Had Ms. McKelvey believed that the 1994 FFCL was a
result of the Hamilton brothers' fraud, she should have (i) objected to the 1994 FFCL at
the time it was entered; (ii) appealed the order resulting from the 1994 FFCL;
(iii) asserted in her first three sets of pleadings in this case that her original distribution of
stock was a result of fraud; (iv) raised her fraud defense when answering the Hamilton
brothers' counterclaims; or (v) raised her fraud defense in some other fashion
immediately upon learning that the Hamilton brothers were relying upon the 1994 FFCL.
Ms. McKelvey did none of these. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion
in denying Ms. McKelvey's request to amend the pleadings as a last desperate stab.
To escape this conclusion, Ms. McKelvey argues that Hansen v. Morris supports
her claim that she is entitled to assert new claims for the first time during the late stages
of litigation. (AOB at 41-43.) It does not. In Hansen, the plaintiff asserted a statue of
limitations defense, i.e. he contended that one of the defendant's defenses was invalid
because the defendant had failed to meet that statute of limitations. 283 P.2d at 886. In
contrast, Ms. McKelvey affirmatively alleges specific types of conduct and new causes of
action against the Hamilton brothers to obtain affirmative relief, and not merely to thwart
a defense.
Also, in Hansen and unlike the present case, the court recognized that "[cjounsel
for plaintiff did about all he could to assert the statute [of limitations]." 283 P.2d 884,
886 (Utah 1955). "[A]bout all he could" included conducting discovery and
affirmatively telling the defendants that if they raised certain issues, plaintiff would
counter with the statute of limitations. IdL Here, Ms. McKelvey failed to do anything to
assert her claims, much less "about all [she] could." Ms. McKelvey failed to raise the
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claims in her response to the Hamilton brothers' August 2005 answer and counterclaim
despite the fact that this pleading clearly raised the 1994 FFCL as the basis of the
Hamilton brothers' equity interest. Ms. McKelvey again failed to raise the claims in her
March 2006 second amended complaint after the 1994 FFCL was identified in discovery
responses and the pleadings filed by the Hamilton brothers. Unlike Hansen, as
opportunity after opportunity passed her by, Ms. McKelvey did nothing to raise these
claims.28
This is not a case in which at the time "defendants answered to this complaint,
they could not be required or expected to affirmatively plead to something which was not
even raised." Thomas v. Heirs of Braffet 305 P.2d 507, 511 (Utah 1956). The issues
were raised, and Ms. McKelvey failed to assert her claims even though she could have in
her (i) answer to the counterclaim; or (ii) second amended complaint. While parties are
"not required to anticipate [a] defense," once the defense is presented and they are
presented with opportunities to assert their responsive claims, they cannot claim a lack of
opportunity and wait until the case is all but complete to assert new allegations. Id; see
also Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co., 664 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah 1983)
("The essential facts upon which the statute could have been asserted were known to the
defendant from the beginning. Defendant alleges no surprise, discovery of new evidence
relating to the defense, or other justification for its delay in asserting [the defense].")

The court in Hansen labeled the situation "unorthodox" because there was no
opportunity for the plaintiff to assert the statute of limitations as a defense. Hansen, 283
P.2d at 886. Here, McKelvey was presented with several opportunities and simply failed
to act until it appeared that all of her other causes of action had failed.
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Importantly, the issue of the source of the Hamilton brothers' stock was hardly a
"new issue." Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (Utah 1963) (addressing the need to
"safeguard the rights of... part[ies] to have a reasonable time to meet a new issue if [the
party] so requests"). The issue had been raised two years earlier in this case and more
than a decade earlier in the probate action. The only thing that was new was
Ms. McKelvey's request to insert allegations of fraud and self-dealing to rebut the
Hamilton brothers' rightful ownership of their stock. This is not what courts envision by
liberally allowing the amendment of pleadings to address new issues. The district court
did not abuse its discretion in denying Ms. McKelvey leave to raise new issues.
3.

The Hamilton Brothers Would Suffer Prejudice Had Ms.
McKelvey Been Permitted to File Amended Pleadings

The prejudice to the Hamilton brothers is straightforward. Ms. McKevley sought
to amend her pleadings and introduce evidence of fraud after the close of discovery. In
addition, the fraud claim would permit Ms. McKelvey to attack collaterally an order
granting summary judgment that had been entered after Ms. McKelvey had the
opportunity to fully brief and argue all of her points. It would also obviate the settlement

Ms. McKelvey asserts that the Hamilton brothers will have to prove the validity of the
1994 FFCL. Ms. McKelvey's statutory citation in support of her argument that it is the
Hamilton brothers who bear the burden of proof, however, is inapplicable to the
circumstances of this case. Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-712 (stating that personal
representative's transaction may be voidable "except [by] one who has consented after
fair disclosure" or "the transaction is approved by the court after notice to interested
persons"). It is Ms. McKelvey who bears the burden of proving that the Hamilton
brothers' fraudulently procured their stock or that they were engaged in self-dealing. The
district court correctly ruled that McKelvey was precluded from asserting these new
claims at such a late stage in the proceedings. She had every opportunity to timely assert
these claims and failed to do so.
9256306

37

agreement enforced by the district court. There is simply no reason to force the Hamilton
brothers to defend yet another bite at the apple for Ms. McKelvey.
The district court's ruling should be affirmed.
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Request for Attorney Fees
The Hamilton brothers also request that the court award them their attorney fees
for responding to the first, third, and fourth issues in the opening brief, none of which are
"grounded in fact" or "warranted by existing law." Utah R. App. P. 33.
The first issue—that the 1994 FFCL did not authorize the transfer of stock to the
Hamilton brothers—has no basis in fact or law. The notion that the 1994 FFCL is
ambiguous was denied by Ms. McKelvey in the district court. And the plain language of
the 1994 FFCL reveals that the Hamilton brothers should have received "all remaining
properties" and "assets" of the estate, which is precisely what occurred. (R. 1273; 1251;
1249.) In receiving "all remaining properties," the Hamilton brothers received less net
value of the estate than did Ms. McKelvey, hardly a windfall as Ms. McKelvey
repeatedly asserts. The first issue in the opening brief has no basis in fact or law.
The third and fourth issues in the opening brief pertain to Ms. McKelvey's ability
to assert new fraud and self-dealing claims. These claims also have no basis in fact or
law. This can be seen from the fact that the Hamilton brothers received less than the 1/5
of their father's estate to which they were entitled. The Hamilton brothers therefore
could not have defrauded Ms. McKelvey out of anything, regardless of the basis of
Ms. McKelvey's belated, vague fraud allegations.
Pursuant to Rule 33(c)(1), the Hamilton brothers respectfully request that they be
awarded their attorney fees for time spent responding to the first, third, and fourth issues
raised in the opening brief.
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Conclusion
This court should affirm the district court's rulings granting summary judgment,
enforcing the partial settlement agreement, and denying Ms. McKelvey leave to assert
new claims after all other claims had been dismissed. First, the 1994 FFCL
unambiguiously authorized Ms. McKelvey to receive only 1683 shares of Company stock
and authorized the Hamilton brothers to receive the remaining shares, which is whai
occurred. Second, the parties entered into a partial settlement agreement disposing of all
the parties' claims except Ms. McKelvey's request for a declaration of her ownership
interest in the Company. Based on the correspondence and conduct of both the Hamilton
brothers and Ms. McKelvey, the district court appropriately enforced this agreement.
Finally, the district court acted appropriately and within its discretion when it prevented
Ms. McKelvey from introducing evidence of, amending her pleadings to assert, new
claims after all of her other claims had been disposed of through settlement and summary
judgment. This court should affirm on all counts and award fees and costs.
DATED this 21st day of November, 2008.
SNELL &

Wio

Mfirkt).
Attorney for Appellees
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that the foregoing document was sent via U.S. Mail, postage
prepaid, this 21st day of November, 2008, to the following:
Christopher R. Hogle
Richard D. Flint
Holme Roberts & Owen, LLP
299 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2263
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Tab A

James R. Brown (#456)
J. Scott Brown (#6191)
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Personal Representatives
370 East South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1290
Telephone: (801) 532-7700
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF:
GORDON DEAN HAMILTON,

)
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
)
)
)

Deceased.

)
) Civil No- 903400101 ES
) Judge Guy Burningham

The Petition of Amber McKelvey and Lisa H. Kunz for the
Removal of the Personal Representatives, Stuart G. Hamilton and
Vincent C. Hamilton came on
Burningham

for hearing before the Honorable Guy

on the 5th day of March, 1993 and

December, 1993,

the 28th day of

The Personal Representatives' Motion for Interim

Distribution came on for disposition on the 28th day of December,
1993.

Petitioners McKelvey and Kunz were represented by Michael L.

Deamer, Esq. of Randle, Deamer, Zan & Lee and were
testified.

sworn and

The Personal Representatives and the Estate of Gordon

Dean Hamilton were represented by James R. Brown, Esq. , and J. Scott
Brown, Esq. of Jardine, Linebaugh, Brown & Dunn,
Hamilton

was

sworn

and

testified,

Mr.

Vincent

Mr. Stuart G.
C.

Hamilton's

testimony was proffered, which proffer was accepted by Mr. Deamer

U63

and the Court*

The Personal Representatives also proffered the

testimony of Mr. Merrill Norman of Norman/Loebecke Associates on the
valuation of Hamilton Brothers Electric, Inc. which proffer was
received .without objection.

The Court ^hearing oral argument by

counsel and being fully apprised in the premises now makes the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Petitioners McKelvey and Kunz are daughters of Gordon

Dean Hamilton, deceased.
2.

Gordon Dean Hamilton died, testate, on January 17,

3.

The Last Will and Testament of Gordon Dean Hamilton

1990.

specifically provided for the appointment of Stuart G. Hamilton and
Vincent C. Hamilton as Personal Representatives to serve without
bond.
4•

The Personal Representatives were duly qualified and

appointed by this Court.
5.

Gordon Dean Hamilton specifically provided in his

Will that Stuart G. Hamilton and Vincent C. Hamilton serve:
(a)

".

.

.

free

and

independent

of

court

supervision as the law shall allow. M
(b)

The Personal Representatives

shall make the

shares equal and " . . . that there may be some
difficulties with making the shares equal. . ."

-2-
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(c)

-There will have to be some negotiation between
my

children

to

particularly

corporation

make

the

shares

equal
the

in view of the fact that

would not involve

all heirs

and the

house would probably not involve all heirs"
(emphasis supplied).
(d)

"The Personal Representatives, in addition to
the powers that may be provided by law, shall
have the power to sell and exchange property,
real or personal, for cash or on time, with or
without an order of the Court, as . . • shall
be deemed advisable. .

(e)

The Personal Representatives shall " • . . have
the power to postpone for a reasonable time
such part

of

the

final

distribution

of

my

estate as is reasonable in light of tax audits,
lawsuits, disputed claims or similar matters
remaining unresolved."
(f)

"The distribution of the whole or part of my
estate .
partly

. • may be made in cash or kind, or

in

cash

and

partly

in kind,

as

my

personal representative shall deem advisable •"
6-

Gordon

Dean

Hamilton

was

aware

of

the

nature,

disposition and abilities of each of his children and specifically
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chose Stuart G, Hamilton and Vincent C. Hamilton as his Personal
Representatives and granted to them the widest possible authority
and discretion,
7.
the

bases

Petitioners allege the provisions of § 75-3-611 as

of

grounds

Representatives.

seeking

the

removal

of

the

Personal

There are three bases provided in § 75-3-611(2)

which bases are summarized as follows:
(a)

in the best interest of the estate;

(b)

the

personal

misrepresented

representatives
material

facts

have
in

the

proceedings leading to their appointment; and
(c)

the personal representatives have disregarded
a

court

discharging

order,

or

become

incapable

of

their duties, or mismanaged

the

affairs of the estate,
8.

The Petitioners have not sought nor alleged any of

the bases delineated in (a) and (b) above.
finds

that there

is no evidence

The Court specifically

even offered

for

the

grounds

contained in (a) and (b) above,
9.

The

Petitioners

allege

that

the

Personal

Representatives failed to obey an order of the Court granting them
access

to the financial information relating to the Estate and to

the Hamilton Brothers Electric, Inc.
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10.

The Personal Representatives provided the following

financial information as per the Court Order:
(a)

Audited

financial

statements

for

the years

1989, 1990, 1991, 1992 and 1993 (fiscal year
ends February 28, 1993).
(b)

A

detailed

accounting

of

all

loans

from

Hamilton Brothers Electric to the Estate*
(c)

A detailed accounting of all transactions about
the purchase of a replacement boat for the
company,

and

all

personal

loans

and/or

transactions.
(d)

The entire bank records of the Gordon Dean
Hamilton

Estate, including

a copy of

every

canceled check and deposit,
(e)

A

detailed

liabilities

accounting
of

the

of

Estate,

all

assets

together

and
with

schedules.
(f)

The tax returns and schedules filed with the
IRS

and State Tax Commission for inheritance

taxes.
(g)

Copies of the Amended Inventory, together with
schedules, dated February 7, 1991.

(h)

Interim

financial

statements

on

Hamilton

Brothers Electric.
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(i)

Accountants Report on the Gordon D. Hamilton
Estate for 1991, 1992.

(j)

Verification of interim distribution to heirs,

(ic) Various interim accountings from Neil Strong,
CPA; Douglas Morrison, Attorney at Law; George
S• Mays•
(1)

Verification that as of December 21, 1992 Mr.
Stuart G. Hamilton
ticket

to

Amber

offered
McKelvey

to send a plane
to

allow

Amber

McKelvey to look at, review, copy any record,
statement, invoice, checking account or other
financial

documents

of

Hamilton

Brothers

Electric and/or the Estate, with such review to
be for the benefit of both petitioners •
(m)

Various minutes of the Board of Directors of
Hamilton Brothers Electric relating to:
i.

Football and basketball tickets;

ii-

The purchase of the replacement boat;

iii. All bonuses (both before and after Gordon
D. Hamilton's death)•
iv.

The

repayment

to

Hamilton

Brothers

Electric of all funds embezzled by Robert
L. Stokes.
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(n)

All updated valuations on the real property and
the

current

valuation

by

Norman/Ijoebbecke

Associates.
11.

Amber McKelvey declined to come to review any of the

12.

The Personal Representatives offered to allow Lisa

records•

H. Kunz, provided she was accompanied by Mr. Deamer, to come to the
offices of Hamilton Brothers Electric to review financial records*
This offer was likewise not followed through by Ms. Kunz and Mr.
Deamer.
13.

The Court finds that the Personal Representatives

were justifiably apprehensive of allowing Lisa H. Kunz, without
being accompanied by
upon

previous

Mr. Deamer, to go through the records based

experiences

of

confrontation

and

inappropriate

behavior which would have been disruptive of the operations of
Hamilton Brothers Electric.
14.

The Personal Representatives were justified in not

making a distribution of the stock of 20% to each heir inasmuch as
*. . . not all heirs would be involved in the corporation" and for
the reasons of pending tax audits, pending litigation, claims by
Mary Hamilton, the lack of dividends and the personal involvement
of Stuart G. Hamilton and Vincent C. Hamilton in the operations of
the company.
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15-

The Court finds that Amber McKelvey, Lisa H. Kunz and

Tonua Hamilton have had very limited involvement with th£ actual
running of the corporation, while Stuart G- Hamilton and Vincent C*
Hamilton have been actively involved for a period of at least twenty
or more years and have been a significant factor in preserving the
corporation as an asset for all heirs.
16-

The Court finds that the corporation has historically

owned a boat and that the 1992 Four Winns Boat is a replacement boat
owned by the corporation and appears on the corporation books and
because of the trade-in of the prior boat the value on the corporate
books of the 1992 boat is fair and equitable and no heir is being
disadvantaged in his or her appropriate share of the Estate.
17.

The corporation has historically, over a period of

15 years, purchased season tickets to BYU football and basketball
games for use with clients and/or family.

The Court finds that all

members of the family have benefitted and that the proper accounting
for

personal

accountants.

vs.
The

business

expenses

have

boen

made

by

the

same is true of trips and travel, including

Holiday Bowls.
18.
paid

Stuart G. Hamilton and Vincent C. Hamilton have been

annual bonuses

Hamilton's death.

of

approximately

$10,000

before Gordon

D.

Immediately after Gordon D. Hamilton's death the

bonding company required personal indemnification from Stuart G.
Hamilton and Vincent C. Hamilton in order to allow the corporation
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to complete the pending jobs and contracts.

The three sisters did

not pledge their assets, but only Stuart G. Hamilton and Vincent C.
No bonuses were paid In

Hamilton did.

1990

as a result of the

bonding company's apprehension and financial requirements. In 1991,
after the bonding company's restriction had

been removed, the

corporation paid a bonus of $24,000 to Stuart G. Hamilton and
Vincent C. Hamilton to make up the 1990 and 1991 bonuses.
19.

The bonding company, because of the efforts of Stuart

G. and Vincent C. Hamilton in operating the corporation has raised
the bonding limits from $5,900,000 to $7,125,000.
20.

Other than the bonuses which the Court finds to be

reasonable, no other bonuses have been paid.
21.

The Petitioners' allegations

of bonuses and fees

being paid in excess of $467,000 is completely without foundation
and no evidence exists to support said allegations.
22.

The Court finds that the lawyers hired or retained

by the Personal Representatives for the Estate have not done any
work for the Personal Representatives individually and that the
Petitioners' allegations of utilizing estate funds to pay for the
Personal Representatives' personal legal representation is without
foundation and no evidence exists to support said allegation.
23.

The

Personal

Representatives

have

not

purchased

;rucks for their own personal use or converted corporate vehicles

-9-

1^.61

for their own personal use and no evidence exists to support the
Petitioners' allegations of misuse.
24 . The Personal Representatives have accounted for all
rents and have deposited the same to the bank account for the
Estate.
25.

The Will is completely dispositive that not all heirs

will be involved in the corporation and Petitioners' allegations to
the contrary are without foundation or substance.
26.

The Personal Representatives have not started a new

corporation to compete with Hamilton Brothers

Electric

and the

allegations of Petitioners are without foundation or substance and
are completely void of any evidence to support any such allegation.
27.
have been

All cash, personal jewelry and items of the Estate

properly accounted for and the Court finds no evidence of

any mismanagement or abuse by the Personal Representatives.
28.

There was no evidence to substantiate any allegation

of improper or unnecessary litigation.
29.

The Court finds that Petitioners failed to show any

evidence of mismanagement or any improper utilization of Estate
assets by the Personal Representatives.
30.

The Personal Representatives have made a full and

complete accounting and the major asset, the corporation, has been
managed appropriately and the value of the corporation has increased
from the date of death of Gordon D. Hamilton.
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31.

All asset or assets have been fully and completely

accounted for and are available, subject to appropriate reserves for
pending litigation and tax audits, for an interim distribution.
32.

The

Court

specifically

finds

that

there

is

no

misconduct on the part of the Personal Representatives and that the
desire expressed in the Will by Gordon Dean Hamilton should be
honored by retaining Stuart G. Hamilton and Vincent C. Hamilton as
Co-personal Representatives of the Estate.
33.

The pending litigation and tax audits are necessary

for the appropriate probating of the Will of Gordon Dean Hamilton34.

The

Personal

Representatives

are

entitled

to

a

reasonable fee for their services and the Court finds that the sum
of One Hundred Thirty-four Thousand Five Hundred Forty

Dollars

($134,540.00) is reasonable and approves the same subject to an
appropriate addition thereto based upon further efforts, time and
application by the Personal Representatives.

The Court's finding

of reasonableness is based upon the following factors:
(a)

The

time

and

effort

spent

by

the

Personal

Representatives;
(b)

The necessity of having the Courts rule upon

and interpret the language and effect of the Antenuptial
Agreement in conjunction with the Will;
(c)

The necessity of having to bring an action to

enforce the terms of insurance policies and the outcome
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thereof, which outcome exceeded several times the costs
and expenses;
(d)

The

necessity

of

forcing

Mary

Hamilton

to

return to the Estate the personal property, the cash, the
cashier's

checks,

and

the

need

to

have

any

family

allowance claim resolved in light of the Antenuptial
Agreement and the Will, together with the determination
of the validity or existence of the life estate;
(e)

The

complex

business

affairs

of

Hamilton

Brothers Electric, Inc. and the pending work in progress
and

the bonding

concerns
contracts

with

company's

the

coupled

restrictions,

satisfactory
with

the

demands

completion

requirement

of

of

and

those

pledging

personally all of the Personal Representatives' personal
assets as additional security to maintain the bonding and
not compelling the corporation to turn over the projects
and jobs to other contractors of the bonding company's
choosing.
35and

that

The litigation, both that which has been concluded

which

is

pending,

was

necessary

for

the

proper

administration of the Estate, The litigation did not unduly prolong
the administration of the Estate and the Court's approval contained
herein of the interim distribution.
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36.
fees

and

The Personal Representatives' fees and the attorney

costs and reserves

as

herein provided

were .and are

necessary to preserve the Estate for the heirs and to distribute the
same in accord with Gordon Dean Hamilton's directions contained in
the Antenuptial Agreement and the Will*
37.

The Court finds that the attorney's fees incurred by

the Estate to be fair and reasonable and approves the fees incurred
of Eighty-one Thousand Eight Hundred Eighteen Dollars ($81,818.00)
through November 1993 and hereby approves the same as reasonable and
necessary.

It is recognized that additional attorney's fees will

necessarily be incurred to conclude the pending litigation and tax
audits.
38.

The Court accepts the proffer of Mr. Merrill Norman

of Norman/Loebbecke Associates as an expert in business valuations
and his written report and finds the value of the corporation to be
$841,000.00 as of December 28, 1993.
39.

The Court finds the total present value of the Estate

to be as follows:
(a)

Real Property.
House, Lots 20 and 21

$235,750

1/2 of Lot 11, all of Lot 12

$11,500

South State Street

$11,500

1 Acre in Spanish Fork

$12,000

.13 Acre - Lot 43

$10,000
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655
South
Main
(liquor
store
[$45,000],
Hamilton
Brothers
Electric [$170,000], commercial lot .
[$85,000])
$300,000
Total Real Estate
(b)

Hamilton Brothers Electric Stock

$841,000

(c)

Mortgages, Notes and Cash

$120,876

(d)

Insurance

$223,000

(e)

Miscellaneous property

$134,904

(f)

Annuities and Profit Sharing
Total Gross

40necessary

$580,750

The

Court

finds

$56,712

Estate

the

following

SI,957,242
expenses

to

be

and reasonable subject to pending litigation and tax

audits :
(a)

Funeral expenses

$12,779

(b)

Debt expenses

$94,805

(c)

Mortgage expenses

$17,329

(d)

Mary Hamilton

$290,804

(e)

Administrative and Attorney's Fees

$216,358

(f)

Taxes

$301,600

(g)

Miscellaneous expenses

(h)

Reserves
attorney's
fees

for
fees

tax
audit,
and a p p r a i s a l

Total Expenses and Reserves

$3,202

$128,500
SI,065,577
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41.

The Court finds that the net Estate, available for

distribution to be:
Gross Estate

$1,957,242
SI,065,577

Less Expenses and Reserves

$891,665
or the sum of $178,333 for each heir.
42.

The Court finds that the following distributions have

previously been received by each of the heirs:
(a)

Insurance proceeds

$33,512

(b)

Household goods in kind

(c)

Cash distribution

$5,980
$14,000

Total
43.

The Personal

$53,492

Representatives have made two proposals

by way of an interim distribution to Amber McKelvey, Lisa H. Kunz
and Tonua Hamilton.
real

property

with

proportionate share.

The first being a distribution in kind of the
a

payment

of

cash

to

reach

each

heir's

The second alternative to be paid in cash and

deferred cash and payments over a period not to exceed 10 years with
six percent (6%) interest on the unpaid portion with minimum annual
payments of not less than $20,000.
44.

The

cash

and

cash

deferred

payment

alternative

started with a proposed distributive share of $195,000 to each heir
as opposed to the $178,333 actual amount determined by the values
found by the Court.

The proposal of cash and deferred cash would
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be the personal obligation of the Personal Representatives and would
be secured by all of the realty contained in the Estate except the
Hamilton Brothers Electric lot, which lot would be conveyed to
Hamilton Brothers Electric in partial satisfaction of the loan due
Hamilton

Brothers

Electric

from

the

Estate.

The

Personal

Representatives would undertake to sell all remaining real property
and the net proceeds after selling costs would be disbursed to Lisa
H. Kunz and Tonua Hamilton upon receipt thereof with the condition
that if no realty is sold, in any year, there would be a minimum
payment of $20,000 paid.
45.

Amber McKelvey has withdrawn her Petition to Remove

the Personal Representatives and has elected to receive stock in
Hamilton Brothers Electric on the following basis:
(a)

Interim distribution due

(b)

Less prior distribution

(c)

Net distribution in stock

$195,000
$53,492
$141,508

Amber McKelvey is to receive stock in Hamilton Brothers Electric at
the rate of $84.10 per share or 1,683 shares, together with a onefifth pro rata share of the adjustments of tax reserves, attorney's
fees and costs reserve, and the Mary Hamilton awards; or Amber
McKelvey may elect, provided said election is made on or before
January 29, 1994, to take her share on the same basis as offered to
Lisa H. Kunz and Tonua Hamilton.

In the event that Amber McKelvey

-161£04

does not make a timely election/ she is to receive the 1,683 shares
of stock as herein provided.
46-

The Personal Representatives interim distribution by

way of cash and deferred cash payments to Lisa H. Kunz and Tonua
Hamilton is summarized as follows:
(a)

Interim distribution share

(b)

Less prior distribution

(c)

Net distribution

$195,000
553,492
$141,508

The $141,508 is to be paid as follows:
(a)

$37,500 in cash, December 30, 1993.

(b)

$104,008 together with interest at the rate of
6% to be paid in annual installments of not
less than $20,000 per year until paid, with the
payments to be made on or before December 30th
of each year until paid.

(c)

The Personal Representatives will cause to be
sold the following real property with the net
proceeds to be paid upon receipt thereof:
i*

Liquor store

ii.

Commercial Lot on South Main

iii. .13 acre - Lot 43
iv,

1 acre in Spanish Fork

v.

1/2 of Lot 11 and all of Lot 12
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provided that there is a sale or sales of any
or all of the real property herein designated
and the net proceeds thereof exceed $20,000 to
Lisa H. Kunz and Tonua Hamilton per year, no
additional

payment

is

required

Personal Representatives-

from

the

However, if no real

property is sold during each calendar year, the
Personal

Representatives

must

pay

at

least

$20,000 to Lisa H. Kunz and Tonua Hamilton
until the balance of $104,008 together with
interest at the rate of 6% is paid in full.
Upon receipt of sale proceeds, the interest is
to be paid current and all remaining funds are
to be applied to the principal of $104,00847-

The Court finds that the second alternative, the cash

and cash deferred payment is fair and equitable and hereby adopts
the same for the interim distribution.
'4 8.

Each

heir

is to deed

the real

property

to the

Personal Representatives for purposes of effectuating the Interim
Distribution and the Personal Representatives are to grant to Lisa
H. Kunz and Tonua Hamilton a lien upon said real property of the net
sale proceeds up to the total amount of $104,008 together with
interest at the rate of 6%.
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49-

The

Personal Representatives

are

to continue

to

administer the affairs of the Estate, to conclude the litigation,
the tax audits and are to hold Amber McKelvey, Lisa H. Kunz and
Tonua Hamilton harmless" from any attorney's fees and tax liabilities
which

exceed

the

reserves,

if

any.

All

five

heirs

are

to

participate in any excess of the reserves of $128,500 not actually
expended, together with any adjustments of properties which may be
returned to the Estate from Mary Hamilton on a pro rata one-fifth
basis.
50.

The Petitioners have incurred attorney's fees and

costs with Mr. Deamer.

Mr. Deamer represented to the Court that he

has been paid $3,000 by Amber McKelvey and that there remains an
amount due for attorney's fees of approximately $12r000.

Some of

the fees have been incurred in settlement negotiations and not in
pursuance of the Petition.
51.

The Court finds that Mr. Deamer should be awarded

$6,000 of his fees to be paid from the Estate.
52.

The

Court

possession a John Deere
Electric.

finds

that Lisa

H.

Kunz

has

in

her

tractor belonging to Hamilton Brothers

Lisa H. Kunz is to return the John Deere tractor to

Hamilton Brothers Electric.
53.

All other assess

of the Estate, except the reserves

of $128,500 and the Mary Hamilton property, is to be distributed to
Stuart G. Hamilton and Vincent C. Hamilton in kind, subject to the
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terms of the cash and deferred cash payment Lisa H. Kunz and Tonua
Hamilton and the stock to be distributed to Amber McKelvey.
54.

At the conclusion of the hearing, Petition Lisa H.

Kunz, through counsel withdrew her Petition.
55.

The heirs, subject to the orders and provisions

contained herein, mutually release each other from any and all
claims, demands or actions.
Having made the foregoing Findings of Fact now enters the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Petition of Amber McKelvey and Lisa H. Kunz is

without merit and there is no evidence to support the allegations
contained therein and the same having been withdrawn is denied with
prejudice.
2.
Distribution

The Personal Representatives ' Motion for an Interim
is granted

and

an Order reflecting

the terms and

conditions as set forth in the Findings is to be prepared for
distribution of 1,683 shares of Hamilton Brothers Electric stock to
Amber McKelvey, or upon a timely election the sum of $141,508 in
lieu

thereof, the

sum

of

$141,508

to Lisa

H.

Kunz

and Tonua

Hamilton.
3.

All five heirs are to participate in the following

assets of the Estate on a one-fifth basis:
(a)

Reserves not actually expended.
-20i ?~n

(b)

The

properties

herstofnre

a-ura-rd&d t o

Mary-

subject

the

Hamilton.
4.

All

other

p r o p e r t y of

the

Estate,

to

t e r m s and c o n d i t i o n s o f a l i e n on t h e r e a l p r o p e r t i e s i n f a v o r

of

L i s a H. Kunz and Tonua H a m i l t o n ,

G.

are t o be awarded t o S t u a r t

H a m i l t o n and V i n c e n t C. H a m i l t o n i n k i n d .
5.

The l o t ,

valued at

$170,000 which

is

utilized

by

H a m i l t o n B r o t h e r s E l e c t r i c i s t o be t r a n s f e r r e d t o Hamilton B r o t h e r s
E l e c t r i c a s p a r t i a l s a t i s f a c t i o n of t h e l o a n t o t h e E s t a t e which i s
d u e and p a y a b l e t o H a m i l t o n B r o t h e r s
6.
findings

of

attorney's

Electric.

The O r d e r of D i s t r i b u t i o n i s t o r e f l e c t t h e C o u r t ' s
approval
fees,

of

the

including

Personal
Mr.

Representatives'

Deamer's,

fees

and

and

the

additional

orders

and

provisions

reserves.
7.
contained

The

herein,

heirs,
mutually

c l a i m s , demands o r
DATED t h i s

subject

to

release

the

each

other

from

any and

all

actions.
. P l ^ ' d a v of J a n u a r y ,

1994.

BY THE COURT:

OUY Ft. BURNINGHAM
GUY BURNINGHAM
District Court Judge
TO FORM:

1%0&r-/-JP~??'
L L. DEAMER
-21-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ^ 2 j _ " d a Y

of

January 1994,

I caused true and correct copies of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be served by first-class United States
mail/ postage prepaid, to the following:
Michael L. Deamer
RANDLE, DEAMER, ZARR & LEE
139 East South Temple, #330
Salt Lake City r Utah 84111-1103;
Stuart G. Hamilton
655 South Main
Springville, Utah 846&3
Vincent C- Hamilton
655 South Main
Springville, Utah 84663
Lisa Hamilton Kunz
1430 So, 500 East:
Springville, Utah 84663
Tonua Hamilton
1803 East Hollywood Ave.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108
Amber Hamilton McKelvey
1010 Flintridge Ave.
La Canada, California 91011

{*>( iT^t/

i^w

JRBP10X7.1

-22-

U4.

TabB

James R. Brown (#456)
J. Scott Brown (#6191)
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Personal Representatives
370 East South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1290
Telephone: (801) 532-7700
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF:
GORDON DEAN HAMILTON,

)
)
)
)
)

ORDER DENTING PETITION TO
REMOVE THE PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVES AND GRANTING
INTERIM DISTRIBUTION

)

Deceased.

}
) C i v i l No. 903400101 ES
) Judge Guy Bumingham

The Court b e i n g f u l l y a p p r i s e d i n t h e p r e m i s e s and h a v i n g
received

evidence

from

witnesses,

having

received

proffered

t e s t i m o n y and e x h i b i t s , h e a r i n g o r a l argument by c o u n s e l and h a v i n g
h e r e t o f o r e made and e n t e r e d i t s F i n d i n g s o f F a c t and C o n c l u s i o n s o f
Law, i t

is

hereby,
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED t h a t

McKelvey

and

Lisa

H.

Kunz,

Petition

Representatives i s denied with prejudice.

to

Petitioners',
Remove

it

is

the

Personal

further,

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g
D i s t r i b u t i o n i s approved by t h e Court t o t h e r e s p e c t i v e
(a)

Amber McKelvey.

Amber

The i s s u a n c e o f

Interim

heir:

1#683 shares

o f H a m i l t o n B r o t h e r s E l e c t r i c S t o c k o r upon a
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timely election received on or before January
29, 1994, receive the same cash and deferred
payments equal to that of Lisa H. Kunz and
Tonua Hamilton.

If no election is received,

the stock will be issued as full distribution
to Amber McKelvey.
Lisa H. Kunz and Tonua Hamilton,

The sum of

$141,508 to be paid as follows:
i.

$37,500 on or before December 30, 1993*

±i.

The balance of $104,008, together with
interest at the rate of 6% from and after
December 30, 1993, to be paid in annual
installments of not less than $20,000 per
year,

iii* The real properties of the Estate, with
the exception of the Hamilton

Brothers

Electric ground, will be sold and the net
sale proceeds will be paid one-half to
each, and provided that there are proceeds
equal to or greater than $20,000 received
by each, no other payment will be required
in each calendar year.

However, if no

real property is sold, a minimum payment
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of

$20,000 each

is to be paid by

the

Personal Representative to each,
iv.

A lien is to be recorded against the real
properties to be sold securing the payment
of

the

$104,008

obligation

and

the

$104,008 obligation is to be evidenced by
a Promissory Note executed by Stuart G.
Hamilton

and

Vincent

C.

Hamilton

personally.
It is further,
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that all heirs are to deed
to the Personal Representatives all of the real properties and the
Personal Representatives are to grant to Lisa H. Kunz and Tonua
Hamilton a lien to secure the payment of the $104,008 balance.

It

is further,
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
utilized

by Hamilton

Brothers

Electric

be

the real property
deeded

to

Hamilton

Brothers Electric as partial payment of the loan due from the Estate
to Hamilton Brothers Electric,

It is further,

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that there is to be reserved
the sura of $128,500 for attorney fees, appraisals and taxes
conclude the pending litigation and tax audits.

It Is

to

further,

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Stuart G. Hamilton's
and Vincent C. Hamilton's personal representative fee of $134,540
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is approved, subject to said fees being augmented in an additional
amount based upon a future application to this Court accompanied by
an affidavit setting forth the time and efforts of the Personal
Representatives,

It is further,

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the attorney

fees

incurred by the Estate are reasonable and are approved in the sum
of $81,818.00, through November 1993, together with the fees of
$6,000 hereby awarded to Michael L. Deamer-

It is further,

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that all , obligations for
attorney fees, additional personal representative fees, costs and
taxes which may result in the further administration of the Estate,
the pending litigation and tax audits are to be the responsibility
of the Personal Representatives if the same exceeds the reserves of
$128,500.

The three heirs, Amber McKelvey, Lisa H. Kunz and Tonua

Hamilton, shall be indemnified by the Personal Representatives for
any amount or amounts which exceed the reservesORDERED,

ADJUDGED

AND

DECREED

that

It is further,
all

remaining

properties of the Estate, other than the reserves of $128,500 and
the properties heretofore awarded to Mary Hamilton, be distributed
to Stuart G. Hamilton and Vincent C. Hamilton equally.

It is

further,
0RDEBEDf ADJUDGED AND DECREED that all five heirs are to
receive one-fifth of any of the reserve of $128,500 not actually
expended, together with one-fifth of any properties that may be
-4i ^ "7 0

returned to the Estate as a result of ^pending litigation with Mary
Hamilton.

It is further,
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Lisa H. Kunz is to

return to Hamilton Brothers Electric the John Deere Tractor to
It Is

Hamilton Brothers Electric.

further,

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that subject to the orders
contained herein, the heirs are released from any and all claims,
demands or actions each against the other.
DATED this

%V

da

Y

of

January, 1994.
BY THE COURT:

GUY R. BURNINGHAM
GUY BURNINGHAM
District Court Judge
TO FORM:

/-?-0-? <&<£/
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ^ 3 1 ^ " day of January. 1994,
I caused true and correct copies of the foregoing ORDER to be served
by

first-class

United

States

mail,

postage

prepaid,

to

the

following:
Michael L. Deamer
RANDLE, DEAMER, ZARR & LEE
139 East South Temple, #330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1103;
Stuart G- Hamilton
655 South Main
Springville, Utah 84663
Vincent C. Hamilton
655 South Main
Springville, Utah 84663
Lisa Hamilton Kunz
1430 So. 500 East
Springville, Utah 84663
Tonua Hamilton
1803 East Hollywood
Ave.
Salt Lake City,
Utah 84108
Amber Hamilton McKelvey
1010 Flintridge Ave.
La Canada, California 91011

f${

(X. S W ' ^ C N ^
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-6-

1^71

